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Abstract 
 
How can senior policymakers use data in the design of ethics (anti-corruption) related 
legislation and regulations? In this paper, we describe how to draft subsidiary legislation 
(mainly executive agency regulations) based on explicit or implied competencies given 
by national legislation. We then discuss how to conduct the organisational, legal, 
economic and audit analysis needed to allocate ethics-related rights and obligations 
across-government and within the Agency. We illustrate with an example from Romania 
and use the tools we have presented to make recommendations for Hungary. We describe 
the roles that the human resource managers and internal auditors play in implementing 
the provisions of Agency-level ethics-related regulations. We conclude by encouraging 
policy makers to make greater use of ethics-related regulations.  
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Introduction 
 
Hungary represents a peculiarity among countries – being part of a group of countries 
lacking a whole-of-government code of conduct. Not all countries need ethics-related (or 
code of conduct specific) laws. OECD Member States exhibit wide variation in the way 
they regulate public officials’ ethics and implement governmental codes of conduct. Such 
variation (mostly) reflects each administration’s optimal organisational response to its 
ethics-regulatory needs. In other words, OECD Member States (usually) give authority 
over ethics-related rulemaking to the official and agency which can make the most 
impact on government probity. In some cases like in the US, rulemaking powers focus 
strongly in the Office of Government Ethics and centres around very legalistic methods. 
In other cases like Sweden, very decentralised ethics-related rulemaking occurs at the 
agency (or sub-agency) level -- with rather loose codes of conduct. The optimal public 
sector ethics programme “fits” with the public sector’s needs.1 
 
This paper argues for the design of executive regulations based on empirical data rather 
than simply gut-feeling. We use the Hungarian Ministry of Public Administration and 
Justice as an example, arguing in this case, they should prepare an executive order 
(signed by the Prime Minister) which provides the legal basis for agency-level and sub-
national government ethics regulations. Such a regulatory strategy (in our view) places 
the authority for ethics-related lawmaking at the optimal level of government – the 
agency/regional level. Our recommendation stems from the best “contingent fit” between 
the Hungarian government’s needs (as assessed using empirical methods) and 
administrative rulemaking.  
 
Our paper is organised as follows. The first part of this paper provides an overview of 
such evidence-based ethics-regulation – and provides the evidence leading to our 
recommendation. The second section describes the method of drafting agency-level 
regulations around existing legislation (specifically the 2012 Public Servants Act). The 
section also describes the link between observed data and the optimal locus for ethics-
related rulemaking authority. The section also provides specific elements needed for 
Hungarian rulemaking. The third section talks more about the institutions involved in 
ethics-related law – showing when data call for the role of each institutions and reviews 
drafting issues. The next sections describe the role of human resource departments and 
                                                 
1 Such a contingency-based view of government’s adaptation of ethics-related laws and regulations reflects 
only one possible view of regulation in OECD Member State government agencies. We adopt the 
contingency-based view as such an approach provides a clear method of analysis allowing for clear 
recommendations related to regulatory drafting and desired administrative conduct.   
internal audit departments in implementing ethics-related regulations. The final section 
concludes.  
 
Using Empirics to Define the Ethics Programme  
 
The older OECD Member States have used empirical methods to guide their public sector 
ethics programmes. Experience earned through decades (and sometimes through 
centuries) of debate, administrative conflict and adjustment have served as the basis for 
an evolutionary approach to public sector ethics-related rulemaking.2 In contrast, the new 
democracies of Central Europe have not had the time to engage in such learning-by-doing. 
Their legislation, regulation, and ways of working in the office represent clear breaks 
with their pre-1989 administrations. Yet, by gathering statistics about existing ethical 
norms and preferred behaviours, Central European governments (like Hungary) can 
bypass the years of data-collection-through-experience of their Western European peers. 
Such data can answer three questions. First, how much agreement exists among public 
officials on specific aspects of public sector ethics? Second, how much regulation should 
be done at the central level versus local (or agency) level? Third, how general (non-
specific) should ethics-related legislation, regulation and non-binding admonitions (like 
codes of conduct and posers on walls) be? 
 
Even a simple example shows the importance of gathering statistics before engaging in 
any ethics-related lawmaking. Figure 1 provides an example of simulated survey results 
across Hungary to the question “do you have direct experience with a conflict of interest 
as a civil servant?” We provide simulated data because OECD governments do not share 
with the public the results of their survey work and analysis of their ethics-related 
regulation. The wide variance of experiences shown in the Figure leads to two possible 
(and conflicting) conclusions. First, the Hungarian parliament (and/or Prime Minister) 
should devolve authority to engage in ethics-related regulation to the local level. In that 
way, local agency directors can adopt regulations appropriate for the level of conflict of 
interest in their administration. Second, such disparity signals the need for a strong, 
central law in order to reduce the variance of outcomes shown in the data. An analyst 
with advanced training in organisational theory will be able to present the best outcome 
based on further data collection and analysis.3 We present this example to help convince 
the reader that policymakers considering legislative, regulatory and other work on 
public sector ethics should base their analysis on data before deciding questions like 
where to place the authority for ethics-related rulemaking.  
 
                                                 
2 Hubert et al. (2008) provide an excellent overview of ethics in codes of conduct, administrative law and 
in practice across government and in specific agencies (like the police) in a variety of countries.  
3 We can not teach the reader how to conduct an organisational analysis in this policy brief anymore than 
we can teach how to analyse regulation. At this point, the senior policymaker only needs to know that 
ethics-related policymaking requires these skills in many OECD administrations. For the curious reader 
interested in learning the basics of organisational analysis, we recommend Mary Jo Hatch’s Organization 
Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
Figure 1: Simulation of Survey Results: Geographical or Function Heterogeneity 
Can Determine Optimal Allocation of Rulemaking Competencies 
 
                   
 
 
The data clearly show that senior policymakers craft their ethics-related regulations and 
practices in response the environments they work in. Figure 2a shows the relationship 
between the extent of unethical behaviour in a country’s public administration and the 
extent of formal ethics-related law and rulemaking. The Figure shows the extent of 
unethical behaviour (on the y-axis) as measured by the practice of 12 unethical practices 
in EU member states. A score of 1 means the practice virtually does not exist while a 
score of 4 means the practice represents “a major problem.”4 The x-axis represents an 
index of the extent to which EU Member States have adopted formal measures to reduce 
unethical behaviour.5 No relationship appears in these data to suggest that using formal 
ethics-related regulations increases the extent to public officials behave ethically. Figure 
2b shows the relationship between the extent to which governments in the EU rely on 
formal rules for regulating ethics as opposed to informal practices.6 The reader will 
notice that this charts also looks like a cloud – that no discernable pattern existing in 
these data. Further statistical analysis can help find correlations and other patterns in 
                                                 
4 The specific types of misconduct Moilanen and Salminen (2006) look at include sexual harassment, 
ethnic discrimination, gender discrimination, private misconduct, abuse of information, fraud, grand 
corruption, improper lobbying, conflict of interest, petty corruption, waste, and favouritism. 
5 These formal measures include introducing disciplinary mechanisms, penal sanctions, formal reporting 
procedures, informal reporting procedures, existence of ethics bodies, protection of whistle-blowers and 
confidential integrity counsellors. A score of 1 means the country’s administrative agencies use such a 
measure and 3 means they do not use that measure. Thus, lower average country scores means that a 
country employs more formal measures.  
6 The authors look at informal practice like the use of leadership, training, communication, recruitment, and 
mobility.  
these data. We do not do this analysis because we do not wish to turn this brief into a 
PhD dissertation on ethics. Instead, we want the reader to accept that ethics-related 
legislation, regulation and practice responds (in part) to the externally imposed needs of 
e administration.   
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Figure 2a: Different Governments Adapt Differing Levels 
of Formal Ethics Regulations
Source: Moilanen and Salminen (2006).  See text for description. 
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Figure 2b: No Relation Between Formal and 
Informal Ethics Measures
Source: Based on a Index from Moilanen and Salminen (2006). 
 
We provide one more example to help prove that data can help guide policymakers in 
their design of ethics-related law. Figure 3 shows the correlation between the number 
administrative levels of government and a country’s reliance on formal and informal 
ethics-related rulemaking. For example, EU Member States with one level of governmen
averaged 2.05 on the index of unethical behaviour (the lowest and thus best score out o
the three groupings of countries).
of 
t 
f 
 
e 
 importantly determine the best mix 
r formal and informal ethics-related regulation.  
Figure 3: gulations 
and Multi-Tiered Governments on Informal Ethics Regulation 
 
7 These single-tier governments did not seem to rely
excessively on either informal ethics regulations and practices, or on codified formal 
ethics-related laws. Governments with three (or more) levels of administration had th
most unethical governments (according to these data) and the most extensive use of 
informal ethics regulations. These data do not suggest that informal ethics regulations 
provide the least protection against unethical behaviour. Instead, these data suggest that 
factors – like the number of levels in government –
fo
 
Two-Tier Governments in EU Tend to Rely on Formal Ethics Re
 
Index of 
Unethical Index of Extent 
of Informal Regs.  
Index of Extent 
of FBehaviour ormal Regs. 
low bers “bette
vernment 
ges 
f each country’s informal ethics regulations (from Table 10) and formal regulations (from Table 9).  
                                                
 er num r” 
one level go 2.05 1.96 1.85 
two levels 2.27 2.07 1.61 
three levels 2.32 1.76 1.76 
Source: Based on analysis from Moilanen and Salminen (2006). Our indices represent arithmetic avera
o
 
7 We provide these indices to show the importance – and potential usefulness – of statistical data in guiding 
decisions about the design of national-level ethics rulemaking. Our consolidation and averaging of 
Moilanen and Salminen’s data suffers from the usual drawbacks. For example, we take unweighted 
arithmetic averages of scores these authors assigned to various aspects of each EU Member State’s ethics-
related laws and practices.  
 
We argue for evidence-based (empirically-based) whole-of-government ethics regulation
over other methods. First, data – such as those shown in Figure 3 – provide insights that 
simple focus groups and “participative methods” can not find. The fad of “participat
methods” greatly influenced the ethics programmes of the early 2000s (when many
Central European countries designed their public sector ethics programmes). Such 
programmes included organizing workshops, writing ideas on white-boards and simply
throwing all ideas presented into a code of conduct. The resulting ethics programmes 
reflected the most active (loud) workshop members and members who read the same 
literature as the experts writing up the workshop results into codes of conduct. T
workshops would never find the deeper linkages between well-designed ethics 
programmes and actual needs which data find. Second, survey data reduce disputes ov
the best type of ethics programme to implement. Data serve as an objective basis for 
rulemaking (though the interpretation of those data will still remain highly subjective). 
Third, empirically-based ethics regulations prevent the wide spread practice of simply 
copying other countries’ codes of conduct and ethics laws. In early 2000s, many public 
administrations engaged consultants to help them write their ethics regulations and codes 
of conduct. These consultants usually copied similar codes from their own countries – or 
used “toolkits” provided by the UNDP, USAID and other donors. Few commentators can
claim that these approaches have resulted in positive outcomes. Countries whose public
officials exhibit harmful behaviours clearly have a more pressing need to adopt
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ven 1% of its annual operating budget, the amount lost 
ould equal €350 million.8  
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Hungary needs to engage in a directed programme of ethics rulemaking because its 
public administration does not have time to wait decades for these norms to emerge 
spontaneously through evolution. OECD Member States – like the US, France an
UK – have developed their ethics-related administrative law over centuries. The 
Americans have opted for a highly legalistic approach to regulating public sector ethics. 
The French have relied on principles in administrative law (enforceable through interna
and external tribunals). For some governments in Central Europe, they do not have the 
time to evolve these ethics-related regulations. OECD Members like the Czech Republic 
and to a lesser extent Hungary --- and particularly countries like Bulgaria and Romania -- 
lose millions of euro every year due to unethical behaviour. If unethical behaviour cost 
the Hungarian government e
w
 
 
 
 
8 We provide this simple example to show the scale of losses due to unethical behaviour. We did not 
present a more rigourous cost analysis of unethical behaviour because we do not want to detract attention 
away from our main point – how to implement ethics programmes. For an example of a more rigourous 
estimation (for the particular ethics-theme of corruption), see Ani Matei and Lucica Matei. (2010). 
Assessing the Anti-corruption Strategies: Theoretical and Empirical Models, Journal of Management and 
Strategy 2(1):23-40.  
 
In general, OECD Member States – particularly at the Agency level – engage in one 
three approaches to ethics rulemaking. Figure 4 shows these approaches as soft-law 
ethics programmes (including non-binding codes of conduct), moral reasoning and the 
hard law approach.
of 
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Figure 4: enting a  
Public Sector-wide Ethics Reform 
9 The soft ethics approach basically uses advertising methods.10 Codes 
of conduct, posters, and other information material remind public officials of their ethical
and moral obligations as agents of the electorate. The moral reasoning approach aims to
move beyond the typical good-and-evil view of ethics. The moral reasoning approach 
tries to show that ethical dilemmas have two sides and that no right answer often ex
moral problems. Instead, the solution to moral problems involves finding creative 
middle-way or out-of-the-box solutions. The hard law approach starts from the p
that all relationships – whatever the level or agency – revolve around rights and 
obligations. Right and obligations do not exist unless enforced by tacit or explicit me
The hard law approach lets public agency directors focus on contractually and 
administratively founded rights and obligations to help support even the most vague 
o
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Source: authors – based on Van Blijswijk et al. (2004).  
                                                 
9 Literally hundreds of typologies and taxonomies exist for categorising public sector ethics programmes. 
We chose these descriptions to keep our analysis simple. See Sampford and Connors (2006) for more.  
10 A number of authors criticise soft law approaches to regulating government ethics on the grounds that 
public officials using soft law do not face the same scrutiny from legal scholars, courts and other 
administrators face. See Sossin and Smith (2003) for more on these critiques.  
 
For countries engaging in the hard law approach, legal drafters must consider two simple 
questions. First, what provisions should ethics-related rulemaking contain? Second, w
should have the competency for ethics-related lawmaking? Policymakers in Central 
Europe tend to prefer the hard law approach when deciding these questions. Such an 
approach matches their administrative system – whereby civil servants are assumed not t
possess a right unless explicitly granted in law.
ho 
o 
irst 
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ent 
he 
 
dministrative 
thics should merely reflect those pre-existing rights and obligations.   
 
Figure 5: Levels of Ethics-Related Lawmaking 
11 We have already talked about the f
question – how to match data about ethics-related needs with popular ethics-related 
provisions. Regarding the second question, Figure 5 shows the major levels for assigning 
competency for ethics regulation. Legislation (laws passed by parliament) will create a
impose certain rights and obligations on public officials – such the obligation to treat 
citizens equally or the right to decide which citizens may receive preferential treatm
based on need or other factors. Agency directors interpret that law in light of their 
administrative traditions and create secondary (or delegated) legislation according to t
principles contained in the relevant legislation and their national administrative legal 
traditions. Even at the agency-level, public officials already possess administrative rights
and obligations given by legislation and (sometimes like in the UK) tradition. Codes of 
conduct, ethics regulations and disciplinary actions revolving around a
e
 
Level of rulemaking Description 
Legislative level cs law 
 Constitution and in 
National law passed by the legislature – such as the US ethi
and recently Romanian law. Legislation should (in theory) 
conform to the values enshrined in the
country’s jurisprudential tradition.12  
Executive agency (ministry 
or department level) 
rticle in legislation defining the 
These regulations reflect explicitly (or implied) delegated 
rulemaking powers. Each section of the agency instruction, 
regulation or order refers to the a
relevant rights and obligations.  
Independent agency (like 
customs) and sub-national 
es 
 to these 
level 
Because these agencies already have devolved competenci
assigned under national law, aw drafter can refer
competencies when drafting ethics regulations.  
Work unit, division level  
f rewards 
and punishments they use to enforce implicit norms.    
Even vague codes of conducts pasted on walls contain implicit 
rights and obligations. Agency directors have a range o
Source: authors.  
                                                 
11 Such an approach contrasts with a system like the UK – where public officials exercise considerable 
discretion over the operation of their department. As long as they work in the interests of their agency, they 
do not need to formally pass instructions and orders. Such a difference has led to numerous frustrations 
among British consultants working in Central Europe! 
12 Contrasting France and the US provides a clear illustration of how basic Constitutional values translate 
into low-level ethics regulations. US Constitutional values place strong emphasis on the rule of law and 
individual rights. As such, ethics has evolved into a highly legalistic system based on rights and obligations. 
In contrast, the French constitution focuses on equality and reflects the idea of society and the body politic. 
These core values have translated into much stronger protections for civil servants acting in the public 
interest.     
 
Legal drafters – particularly at legislative level – need to link ethics-related provisions t
data. Figure 6 shows the example of Romania’s Code of Conduct Law. We choose 
law from a non-OECD Member because the US law is too complex for the simple 
example we want to provide. Other countries’ ethics law lie mostly in administrative 
rather than in a single Act. Article 5 focuses on providing high quality services. Yet, 
survey data by McGee (2005) shows – in the case of tax payers – that they conside
evasion completely unethical (on a scale of 1 to 7).
o 
the 
law 
r tax 
ould 
tance (or lack of importance) of Article 6 of the 
omanian Code of Conduct law.  
 
Figure 6: Law on Civil Servants’ Code of Conduct  
13 Such evidence suggests that 
Romanian tax collectors impel tax payers to avoid taxes through coercion. As such, 
loyalty to public authorities should have been a higher priority – and received more 
legislative attention.14 In some cases, issues like loyalty to the law seem completely 
misplaced.15 A survey question like “do you think its important to obey the law” w
have shed some light on the impor
R
 
Chapter I: Field of Application and General Principles 
Article 1: Field of Application                                                 Article 2: Purpose  
Article 3: General Principles                                                    Article 4: Terms  
 
Chapter II: General Norms of Moral and Professional Conduct for Civil Servants 
Article 5: To provide a high quality public service                    Article 6: Loyalty to the law 
Article 7: Loyalty to public authorities and institutions             Article 8: Freedom of opinion  
Article 9: Public activity                                                             Article 10: Political activity  
Article 11: The use of image                                                       Article 12: Relationships  
Article 13: International relations                                               Article 14: Restrictions on gifts  
Article 15: Participation in decision making                               Article 16: Objectivity 
Article 17: The use of political prerogatives                              Article 18: The use of public resources 
Article 19: Restricted participation in public contracts    
 
Chapter III: Institutional Arrangements 
Article 20: The public institution in charge                               Article 21: Notification 
Article 22: Settling the case                                                       Article 23: Publicity on reported cases  
 
Chapter IV: Final provisions 
Article 24: Accountab           Article 25: Harmonizatioility                                                 n of internal rules 
Article 26: Publicity      Article 27: Enforcement 
 
Source: Romanian Code of Conduct Law 
 
Legal drafters at the legislative level will also need to decide on the ambiguity and 
specificity of provisions which create certain rights and obligations – choosing the level 
                                                 
13 Robert W. McGee, The Ethics of Tax Evasion: A Survey of Romanian Business Students and Faculty, 
available online.  
14 We do not want to make any strong claims about Romania or its tax collection practices. We want to 
provide a public and easy-to-understand example to the reader so he or she will learn how to do this type of 
analysis for him or herself.   
15 We have always been amused about provisions in ethics laws requiring public officials to obey the law. 
Such a tautological provision in effect creates a law which requires civil servants to follow laws. If they 
ignore other laws, why would they suddenly decide to obey the ethics law? 
of ambiguity based on the amount of subsidiary rulemaking legislators want. Figure 7 
shows the specificity, ambiguity and implementability of each article in Romania’s Code
of Conduct law (which we use because the Romanian law has more public commentar
and analysis than other ethics-related laws in the region). Very vague provisions (like 
those in 5, 6, 15 and so forth) may provide a large amount of wiggle-room for agency-
level rule-makers. In practice, leaving articles ambiguous may not result in re
agency-level regulation drafters do not consider that ambiguity provides the 
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Source: authors.
 
 
Legal drafters at the executive agency level need to “tie” provisions in legislation to 
provisions they write in their regulations.16 Figure 8 shows how advisors to an agency-
level director would tie these regulations to legislation in the case of Poland.17 The Code 
of Conduct’s drafters explicitly “tied” the authority for article 1.2 of the executive or
to article 153.1 of the Constitution and article 1 of the Civil Service Act. Similarly, 
lower-level regulators would tie the authority of their agencies’ ethics-regulations to the 
relevant article from the Code of Conduct Law (article 1.2 in our example). The agency-
level executive order would instruct staff how to “respect the dignity of others” in their 
specific agency. For example, they may ask for permission to enter a person’s premises. 
They may require public service users to queue in an orderly fashion and so forth. Noti
“respect for dignity” represents a legal principle defined across the law and contain
clusters of rights and obligations. Likely places to look for the legislative basis for 
passing agency-level codes of conduct and ethics regulations include the anti-cor
law (or prevention of corruption law), conflict of interest law, civil service law, 
constitution (for emerging nation-states), and/or organic regulation of the executive 
government. Public officials’ advisors use the
der 
ce 
s a 
ruption 
 same legal drafting skills that they use 
r regulating other government activities.  
 
                                                
fo
 
 
16 Michael (2012) shows how a national civil service agency might tie regulatory-level provisions to 
national legislation using the example of the Romanian Code of Conduct law.   
17 The Civil Service Code of Ethics, Prime Ministerial Order 114/2002, available online. 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland
(article 153.1)
Civil Service Act 
(article 1)
Figure 8: How to Tie Administrative-Level Ethics Regulations
to Legislation Using Poland as an Example
“he/she shall perform [service] in the respect of the dignity of others.”
(article 1.2 of the Code of Conduct) 
based on article 1.2 of the Code of Conduct regulation, the Director orders each 
employee to a) avoid any derogatory remarks to service users, b) may be suspended for up 
to 2 days (as allowed by authority given to Director under art….)
 
 
Writing an entire code of conduct or ethics regulation entails tying the relevant articles 
from law to agency-level procedures. Figure 9 shows an example of an ethics regulation 
for a customs agency.18 In this example, the Customs Director issued an instruction 
aimed at implementing the Conflict of Interest Law, the Prevention of Corruption Law 
and the World Customs Organisation’s Model Code of Conduct.19 The regulation cites 
(in every single article) the legislative provision that provides the right to regulate. The 
regulation describes what actions customs officials must perform in implementing the 
ethics-related policy, their rights and obligations and sanctions for non-compliance. 
Agency-directors can not simply “make up” codes of conduct or ethics they want. Their 
public administration must work according to the rule of law. Directors must tie ethics 
admonitions in administrative law – otherwise they will not have recourse to 
disciplinary/enforcement actions and may become liable in an administrative court 
for ultra vires action.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 We provide these abstract examples because OECD (and other governments) tend to treat matters of 
ethics as extremely confidential. Such confidentiality stems from fear of political consequences if survey 
data became public and director’s uncertainty about whether they possess the authorities they used in some 
of their rulemaking. While we can crate generalisation based on survey data and regulations we remember, 
we can not provide names and places. We strongly encourage public agencies to publicly share information 
about their ethics programmes so that analysts like us do not need to provide general, abstract examples.  
19 We can not provide details about the identity of the country due to confidentiality. We hope more 
customs directors – and agency directors – make information like this public in the future.  
 
Figure 9: Example Regulation of the Customs Agency Director in Implementing the Ethics-
Related Measures Contained in National Law and International Recommendations 
 
ANTECEDENTS 
 
Chapter 1: Legal authority and interpretation of rulemaking powers   
Chapter 2: Terms used in this text 
Chapter 3: Transfer of Competencies from DG to Deputy Directors-General 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF WCO MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT 
 
Chapter 4: Tests for Ethical Behaviour, Rights and Obligations for Personal Responsibility 
Chapter 5: Procedures for obtaining binding advice on points of law  
Chapter 6: Interpreting Legislative Principles in Relations with the Public 
Chapter 6: Internal Procedures for Dealing with Gifts  
Chapter 7: Public Interest, Conflict of Interest test, and Remedies  
Chapter 8: Political Activities: Reporting, Denouncing and Exemptions  
Chapter 9: Confidentiality and Use of Official Information 
Chapter 10: Use of Official Property and Services 
Chapter 11: Own Rights, Rights of Others and Balancing Test  
 
MEETINGS OF THE ETHICS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE 
 
Chapter 12: Procedures for Summary Judgement 
Chapter 13: Procedures for Internal Hearing 
Chapter 14: Remedial Measures and Defences  
Chapter 15: Procedures for Issuing Ethics-Related Decisions and Amendments to the Present DG 
Instruction 
 
PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTING AND DISSEMINATING DATA ON ETHICS 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
Chapter 16: Surveys of Customs Service Users 
Chapter 17: Internal Surveys Administered by Human Resources Department 
Chapter 18: Procedures for External Reporting on Ethics Proceedings to Commission for 
Stopping Corruption and Annual Report   
Chapter 19: Dealing with the Media and Reporting Cases  
 
TYING ETHICS INTO THE HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT  
 
Chapter 20: Collecting and Using Information about Officers’ Integrity 
Chapter 21: Use of Ethics Evaluation in Career Development 
Chapter 22: Disseminating Information about Present Instruction 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
The quality of regulatory drafting matters for the success of agency-level ethics 
regulations. Legal drafters need to keep several principles in mind when drafting ethics-
related regulations. As modern ideas from economics, legal theory, and public 
administration filter into legal drafters’ attentions, the performance of their regulations 
has increased. Figure 10 provides a glossary of some of drafting concepts from the 1990s 
and 2000s which have found their way into design philosophies of ethics regulations. The 
“carrot and stick” approach uses several of the concepts mentioned in the Figure. For 
every stick (obligation, punishment or negative admonition), regulation drafters should 
define a “carrot” (a right, reward or positive ability to perform). Ethics regulations should 
provide incentives to public officials to follow these regulations without relying on 
expensive inspectors, enforcement officers and checks. In economics language, these 
represent incentive-compatible, self-enforcing, equilibrium ethics institutions.    
 
Figure 10: A Glossary for Would-Be Ethics Regulation Drafters 
 
incentive compatibility – when public officials have incentives to follow new regulation. The use of 
promotion (based on demonstrated ethics performance), bonuses (based on qui tam-like rewards for 
denouncing unethical behaviour), ethics awards, and other policies held create positive incentives for public 
officials to follow ethics-based regulations.   
 
self-enforcing regulation – regulations which do not require having an enforcer or inspector. Such self-
enforcing regulations create incentives for other market or administrative actors to denounce unethical 
behaviour. A free complaints hot-line, the ability to use multiple public service providers and other 
provisions make ethics-related regulations self-enforcing. Potentially destructive tournaments (like in 
planned economies’ administrations) create strong incentives to denounce unethical behaviour of rivals 
working in the same department.   
 
equilibrium (conduct) – a series of behaviours exhibiting no incentives or pressures for change. Many of 
the codes of conduct in Eastern Europe passed in the 2000s were not in equilibrium. Their vagueness 
encouraged further work on changing them. Besides being poorly designed and written, economic, political 
and social change can also create forces for change.  
 
cost-neutrality – a design philosophy whereby ethics regulations do not impose more costs on the Agency 
(or the Agency can recoup additional expenditures with more attractive appeals for budgetary funds or user 
fees).  
 
ethics institutions – the “rules of game” that ethics regulations create. Economists can calculate the impact 
these institutions have on Agency’s members, gains and losses, and strategic reactions to these new rules. 
They can also estimate the likely survival of new rules over time.  
 
delegated authority – the authority specifically given by parliament to executive agencies and/or local 
legislatures to make more specific regulations. Interestingly, most Western European administrative law 
traditions give the right to managers to make regulations (unless forbidden or later appealed). By contrast, 
in most Eastern European countries, administrative tradition forbids managers from making rules unless 
specifically authorised by law to do so.  
 
implied regulatory authority - the right to make agency-level regulations unless prohibited by law. Many 
constitutions outside Eastern Europe devolve authorities not taken by the central (or federal) level.  
 
 
information costs – the cost of gathering information about unethical behaviour and acting on it. The best 
ethics regulations encourage administrative actors to generate and release information about the Agency’s 
ethics. Information costs also create a wedge between de jure regulation and de facto regulation.  
 
 
Which level should Hungarian law focus on? The Hungarian Ministry of Public 
Administration and Justice should prepare an executive order (regulation) from the Prime 
Minister which specifically gives government ministers, agency directors, and regional 
mayors (governors) the right and obligation to engage in ethics-related regulation. We 
refer to four pieces of information which provide a flavour of the way that empirical 
analysis links into organisational strategy. First, we assume that the government will not 
pass another piece of legislation. Thus the 2012 Public Service Act must provide the 
relevant rights and obligations. Yet, the provisions remain so broad that only regional-
level directors can provide the necessary details for any code of conduct or ethics-related 
regulation. Second, the Hungarian civil service ranks relatively well in terms of ethical 
conduct (and corruption). Thus, informal norms work relatively well already. As such, 
formal rules should add-to, rather than replace, existing norms. Third, Hungarian public 
administration delegates a fair amount of competencies to the regional level. Thus, 
regional level work will prove more effective than work centred in Budapest or at the city 
level. Fourth, Hungarian public administration thrives on democracy – though performs 
relatively poorly.20 Thus, a fair amount of consultation suggests a devolved approach to 
ethics-related rulemaking. Of course, we would prefer more rigorous and complete data.   
 
The Institutions In Charge of Implementing Ethics-Related Law 
 
No model ethics arrangement or categorisation of ethics institutions could ever exist. 
Over 7,000 possible configurations of ethics-related institutions exist in a small country 
like Hungary alone.21 If the roughly 10 ethics-related topics reflected in Figure 6 generate 
the creation of one right and one obligation, and legal drafters could assign these rights 
and obligations to each of the 7 institutions listed in Figure 11, then law drafters would 
have 120 possible divisions of rights and obligations to choose from. Some particular 
patterns seem more prevalent among OECD countries than others – particularly those 
leaving ethics-related regulation to the agencies involved.22 However, the actual – rather 
than possible -- combinations of ethical arrangements in OECD member states have made 
any generalisations about the “best” ethics regulations impossible. Appendix I shows the 
way that EU Member States have allocated the responsibility for regulating ethics 
between the central and agency-level.  
                                                 
20 Richard Wike, Hungary Dissatisfied with Democracy, but Not its Ideals, Pew Research, available online.   
21 The formula for combinations Q(n!/(n-r)!r!) where n equals the number of institutions to choose from 
(such as installing ethics related obligations in an Ombudsman, an agency director, civil service agency, 
and the other institutions listed in the Figure). The variable r represents the number of possible institutions 
each institution works with (for example, a ministry relying on the civil service agency and courts would 
represent a total of three institutions). If we include each possible sub-national government institution, 
ministry and agency, we have Q organisations. For even a small estimate of the number of these 
organisations (roughly 200), we would have roughly 2,000 unique ethics arrangements enshrined in their 
own ethics-related rulemaking.  
22 See OECD, Trust in Government: Ethics Measures in OECD Countries, OECD, 2000, available online.  
 
In general, legal drafters at the legislative and regulatory levels have 7 institutions to 
choose from. Figure 11 presents and describes these institutions. Across OECD Member 
States, anecdotal evidence suggests that certain types of public sector organisations 
choose certain arrangements over others. For example, law enforcement agencies – like 
the police and customs – tend to regulate members’ ethics more strictly. Directors of 
these agencies spend considerable more amounts of time overseeing the ethical behaviour 
of their sub-ordinates. Human resource departments often screen applicants based on 
ethics considerations and place notes about unethical conduct in employees’ files.23 
Internal affairs units often conduct investigations on ethics related matters – for offences 
that sometimes do not engender administrative, civil or criminal liability. These ethics-
related investigations pertain to professional ethics. Judiciaries and parliaments often 
impose ethical standards on themselves through standards-setting committees. Public 
service oriented ministries and agencies often oversee employees’ ethics by collecting 
complaints from the public via hotlines.  
 
Figure 11: Generalisations about the Legal Mandates of Various Agencies in 
Creating and Enforcing Ethical Norms 
 
Institution Potential Role Target agencies 
Ombudsmen Accepts complaints – usually related to human rights. 
However, in some jurisdictions, also takes complaints 
about government’s actions generally. Unethical 
behaviour usually not illegal, so naming-and-shaming 
only recourse.  
Law enforcement 
(with more coverage 
in Scandinavia).  
Agency 
Director 
Serve as de facto ethics legislators, judge, and jury in 
most jurisdictions. They pass decisions and 
instructions related to ethical (and operational) topics. 
Main deciders of ethical dilemmas. Ultimately 
accountable (in theory) for ethical breeches.  
Most Ministries and 
Agencies (wider 
coverage in 
Continental Europe, 
Japan) 
Civil Service 
Agency  
In countries with stronger civil service agencies, they 
can pass ethics related instructions. They also can hear 
cases involved in ethical dilemmas. In practice, they 
rarely play a strong role (except in jurisdictions with 
stronger civil service unions).   
Focuses often on 
disputes or wide-
spread problems.  
France and some 
former FSU 
Legislatures Pass laws on ethics, codes of conduct and specific 
pieces of legislation (like in US) within their 
jurisdiction.  
More important for 
multi-tiered small 
countries.  
Administrative 
Courts 
In jurisdictions like US, UK and France, these cases 
set important precedents and examples. Resolution of 
fuzzy gray ethics clashes become codified into 
administrative law.  
Important in 
common law 
jurisdictions 
(US, UK, not Hong 
Kong). 
                                                 
23 Maximilian Ederbacher and Sanja Ivkovic. (2004). Ethics and the Police: Studying Police Integrity in 
Austria. In Carl Klockars, Sanja Ivkovic, Maria Haberfeld. The Contours of Police Integrity. London: Sage.  
 
Standards-
Making Body 
These professional bodies regulate behaviour in 
general. Important for parts of the State like the 
judiciary, state-regulated press and even state-owned 
enterprises.   
Most all OECD 
countries.  
Press  
(with freedom of 
information law) 
The press is where disagreements about ethics are 
given vent. Attracts attention of legislatures and usual 
way ethics change across whole-of-government.  
US and EU.  
Source: Based on OECD (2000) and other sources where available. The summaries we provide represent 
very broad generalisations because of the high variety between institutions even in a single country.  
 
Most legislatures will not create administrative relations between these organisations 
from a tabula rasa. In many of the Western OECD Member States, relations between 
agencies have rigidified into very strict (and sometimes very complex) relationships. In 
Central Europe, many of these administrative relationships remain fluid and ill-defined. 
Senior policymakers and parliamentarians looking to “mix and match” the 
organisations presented above into a coherent system can rely on four techniques. 
First, senior policymakers can accept the economic losses from inefficiency concomitant 
with an evolutionary approach. Such an option basically accepts the status quo – and 
hopes for change later. Second, ministries and agencies enter into Memoranda of 
Understanding (within the executive itself). Such an Memorandum – for example 
between a National Institute of Public Administration, the Civil Service Agency, a 
Ministry and a national standards-setting (self-regulating) body -- can set out the services 
that the body and civil servants agencies will provide to the Ministry (such as conducting 
surveys on ethics). The Ministry – for its part – can agree to consider recommendations 
and codify them as director’s instructions or orders (where allowed). The third technique 
involves using tribunals, administrative courts and even Ombudsman and Civil Service 
Agencies to create ethical doctrine. Each agency creates policies and practices – some of 
which employees and citizens disagree with. They challenge these policies in tribunals or 
courts (depending on the jurisdiction). Judgements over time accumulate and form the 
basis for creating a broader jurisprudence in administrative ethics (especially in the 
common law jurisdictions). The fourth (and most broad) technique revolves around 
involving parliamentarians, senior politicians and senior civil servants in a big bang style 
reform. These senior politicians negotiate on defining legal relations between the 
legislative, judicial and executive branches through the country’s political process. These 
relations allocate rights and obligations to each organisation for specifying ethical 
standards as well as monitoring and enforcing them. Some issues – like bioethics – lend 
themselves to such a whole-of-government approach.24 Yet, for governments in Central 
Europe still struggling with ethics and corruption problems, such a fundamental rethink 
of the basic constitutional law hurriedly made in the early 1990s may be just what the 
doctor ordered.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/index_en.htm  
 
Hungary should follow an organic, evolutionary approach (with each agency making its 
own ethics-related regulations) due to the fractionalisation of the Hungarian political 
process. Hungary has the greatest political polarisation among the advanced economies.25 
The optimal allocation of rights and obligations inherent in ethics-related regulation 
follows four principles. First, assigning authorities and obligations must conform to 
constitutional values, legislation and existing administrative law. Tracing the way rights 
translate from legislation into agency-level regulation requires expert legal drafting.26 
Second, legal drafters – particularly when writing national legislation – allocate rights 
and obligations to each tier of government and agency -- based on empirically-assessed 
needs. Such work requires the skills of organisational theorists who know how to match 
the needs from the organisational environment to the creation of formal institutional rules. 
Third, drafters should engage in ethics-related rulemaking – and allocate responsibilities 
for the enforcement of those rules – based on the social costs and benefits. A half-decent 
economist can determine the optimal allocation of responsibilities which would generate 
the greatest amount of social benefits (in most amount of ethical behaviour) at the least 
cost (in terms of salaries, disputes and monitoring). Government agencies in countries 
like Hungary can design a set of effective ethics laws with a four person team comprised 
of an organisational theorist, a legal drafter, an economist and an auditor.  
 
What Do Human Resources Departments Do in Promoting Government Ethics?  
 
Public agency directors – where allowed by law – enlist human resource departments in 
implementing ethics-related regulations. In short, human resource directors represent the 
only person in an agency able to integrate ethics into each part of the human resource 
management process. Figure 12 shows – in bullet point form – the main ways that human 
resource managers can weave ethics-related regulations and the provisions of a code of 
conduct into the agency’s operations.  
 
Figure 12: Human Resource Managers’ Role in Implementing Ethics-Related Regulations 
 
• check the previous conduct of new hires and transfer staff 
• collect information on ethical and unethical conduct 
• recommend pay and promotion policies based on ethics 
• monitor risks and returns of the ethics programme like any other human resources investment 
• provide counselling on ethics issues (based on HRM staff’s competencies) 
• collect feedback on conduct during performance appraisals 
• recommend staff-wide changes to ethics programmes  
• conduct advertising of ethics-related regulations and codes of conduct 
                                                 
25 Political scientists use a Polarisation Index which (like a standard deviation) measures the extent of party 
fractionalisation. For more on these data, see Russell Dalton. (2008). The Quantity and the Quality of Party 
Systems: Party System Polarization, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences. Comparative Political Studies 
41(7). See Appendix II for the data on political fractionalisation.  
26 Like with the example from organisational theory, we can not teach drafting skills in this short brief. For 
the curious reader looking to learn a bit more about interpreting legislation, regulation and the rules of 
drafting, we highly recommend James Holland and Julian Webb’s Learning Legal Rules: A Student's Guide 
to Legal Method and Reasoning, Oxford University Press, 2003.  
 
 
Human resource departments order, conduct and/or receive background checks and 
employment records. In some jurisdictions, they can ask specific questions related to the 
applicant’s (or transferee’s) ethical conduct during previous employment. Because ethics 
represents a contentious area where different person’s values diverge, a negative 
observation about an applicant’s ethical conduct should not necessarily disqualify the 
person from employment. A public service orientation which gets an employee in trouble 
in one department may represent the ideal quality for a reform-minded minister or agency 
director. The results of thousands of these checks across government provide useful 
epidemiological information about broader changes in ethical principles.27  
 
Within the agency, data on unethical (and ethical) behaviour by the agency’s staff can 
provide the empirical basis for writing and revising ethics-related regulations. Figure 13 
shows an example of the way that ethics data can help fashion ethics-related regulations 
and codes of conduct. For example, in this example, the department took remedial action 
on 10% of all conflict of interest cases. In contrast, the department took steps to fix 
problems in 75% of cases involving complaints by the public. These large differences 
have important implications for the creation and implementation of ethics-related 
regulation. Either conflict of interest rules are too vague to allow for enforcement, or the 
rules are too broad (thus encouraging too many cases to be opened). The other point to 
note revolves around the number of cases. One might expect far more cases of user 
complaints than conflict of interest. These data suggest that service users do not know 
how to complain (though we need to investigate such a hypothesis further).  
 
                                                 
27 With a simple Excel spreadsheet, the HR department can stratify ethics-related data of applicants by 
geographical area, former employment, gender, job category and so forth (if allowed by the country’s data 
retention and privacy laws). Because these data provide a larger sample, analysing data from all applicants 
(rather than only those taking employment with the department) provides more reliable and comprehensive 
information. Because analysts can manipulate aggregate data, information identifying particular individuals 
can be discarded. The complexity of emerging privacy and date retention laws make competent legal 
counsel an absolute requirement before providing the HR department with the competence to analyse these 
types of data.    
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Figure 13: Data about Ethics Violations Can Help Tailor an Agency-Level Ethics 
Based Regulation 
 
 
The volume of cases also suggests a couple of things about ethics-related regulation in 
this agency. Engaging in unauthorised political activity and the exercise of preferential 
discretion do not appear to represent serious problems for this agency. We draw this 
conclusion because the number of these cases represents only a fraction of the other cases 
involving conflict of interest and outside interests.28 In contrast, conflict of interest and 
outside interests represent a larger area of concern. Based on these data, the agency’s 
ethics-related regulations should focus heavily on more detailed procedures designed to 
regulate conflict of interest. Many countries – based on the threat conflict of interest 
poses -- have moved conflict of interest from an ethics-related issue to an issue of black 
letter law.29   
 
Information collected by human resource personnel may also include incident reports. 
These incident reports add details to the aggregate data providing details about staff’s 
negative (and positive) ethics-related behaviour. Such details assist human resource 
managers and agency directors when they review ethics-related regulations each year or 
biannually. If several incident reports show similar problems (or if a couple of incidents 
pose a significant risk to the agency), these details can provide the basis for agency-level 
rulemaking. Managers and staff can also use incident reports during their annual 
performance assessment meetings. Human resources staff can obtain an agency-wide 
view of ethics – taking into account staff’s views (rather than only relying on the views of 
the mangers which discipline staff for ethics-related problems).   
 
Human resources staff also has other functions in dealing with the agency’s ethics-related 
policies and practices. If local law allows for discretionary rewards and/or changes in a 
civil servant’s pay (within his pay grade), human resources staff can help write agency-
specific regulations governing the conditions under which staff may receive annual pay 
 
28 Such a statement naturally requires further examination – taking into account the usual caveats about the 
use of statistics. Many agency directors unwisely summarily dismiss statistics as “lies, damn lies and 
statistics” without giving thought to the potential uses of data like these.  
29 See Demmke et al. (2007) for a detailed overview of such legislation in a European context.  
increases (or discretionary rewards) for ethics-related behaviour. They may also 
contribute to regulations setting ethics-related conditions related to promotion, 
assignments requiring the supervision of sub-ordinate staff and so forth. Human resource 
department staff usually also have the mundane responsibility for ethics 
“advertisements.”30 Such advertisements include posters, regular emails to staff, 
graphical and easy-to-read manuals and other reminders. Human resources staff should 
have colour printers and the same kinds of materials other advertising staff have – so the 
agency’s staff receives the message.  
 
Ethics-related communications should reflect news the viewer can use rather than simple 
propaganda. Figure 14 shows the difference between modern ethics advertising and the 
old-style propaganda approaches. The poster on the left represents a propaganda 
approach (which in fairness the designer made to show a design technique rather than to 
change moral norms). Yet, most ethics posters in the Central European region still reflect 
the propaganda-based approach. In contrast, the poster on the right reflects the Ogilvy 
marketing approach to social advertising.31 The poster informs the viewer how to report 
ethics-related problems and provides a valuable service (advice). The poster builds 
rapport with its intended audience – and contain eye-catching and professional colours 
which draw the viewer to the poster.  
 
                                                 
30 Ethics departments should adopt a marketing approach to ethics rather than an advertising approach. 
Marketing entails the discovery (through surveys, interviews, focus groups) of needs and providing the 
needed information or services. We prefer Ogilvy -style advertisements because they inform the reader 
rather than push propaganda-type messages. Propaganda can led to cynicism – making staff less willing to 
pay attention to future ethics-related messages.   
31 The Ogilvy approach focuses on creating text-heavy advertisements which inform the reader rather than 
simply try to evoke emotions. For a primer on using this technique in social marketing, see David Ogilvy, 
Ogilvy on Advertising, New York: Vintage, 1985.   
 
Figure 14: Colour Ogilvy-style marketing more effective than black and white ads 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Flatiron and Steve Haslip. We use these images under fair-use doctrine.  
  
In some countries, human resource managers also serve as counsellors to staff – 
providing advice on labour-related issues. Counselling on finding the golden mean in an 
ethical problem provides an important skill which human resource managers can use to 
help the agency’s staff. Figure 15 shows an example of the way that a ministry’s or 
agency’s human resources staff can assist with ethics-related dilemmas. Human resource 
managers will understand labour laws and administrative regulations better than staff. 
Therefore, these managers can propose creative compromise solutions which do not 
expose staff to liability for administrative or disciplinary punishments. These managers 
also understand the personalities of the managers involved. So, they can propose 
solutions which superiors and sub-ordinates would find personally acceptable.  
 
Figure 15: Human Resource Departments and their Role in Ethical Arbitrage 
 
In the mid 2000s, we worked with a government agency in a Central European country. 
The Agency’s director had decided to run for parliament, and ordered certain staff to help 
the director campaign for office. The staff felt uncomfortable doing this. However, the 
director had helped many of them in the past, and they felt indebted to the director. The 
human resource manager had an idea how staff could both obey the director without 
compromising their mandate to avoid politicisation of the Agency. They should “klutz it 
up.” They did not have to perform to the high standards of their civil service job while 
putting up signs and posters. Such a middle course avoided a confrontation with the 
director. The solution also avoided the harmful effects of politicisation (as agency staff’s 
work did not contribute to the unofficial objectives given by the director).  
 
 
 
 
In some jurisdictions, human resource managers participate in internal hearings and 
disciplinary proceedings in cases of alleged unethical behaviour. Human resource 
managers serve on these tribunals, panels, and committees because senior managers will 
have conflicts of interest in judging their own sub-ordinates (often having given them 
unethical orders in the first place). Agency directors’ regulations must define the role 
of human resource staff in ethics-related hearings through clarifying government-
wide regulations, defining particular offences and so forth. Ethics counsellors can 
also be used. We do not provide more information because legislation (not present in 
Central Europe) must endow them with certain rights and obligations.32  
 
Conclusions 
 
The design and implementation of ethics-related regulations mirrors the design of any 
regulation. Important skills in organisational theory, legal drafting, economics, and audit 
serve to design and implement ethics-related regulations in exactly the same way they 
serve to implement other kinds of agency-level regulation. Such an insight will 
disappoint the clients of ethics gurus selling nostrums for managing ethics in the public 
sector. In this paper, we have looked at the way legislators and regulators can draft 
ethics-related law. We have discussed how to choose and draft particular provisions in 
national and sub-national legislation and in agency-level regulation. We have shown 
agency directors how to work with internal auditors, economists and human resource 
managers to ensure the most effective, least cost implementation of ethics-related 
regulation.  
 
We have used Hungary as an example to show how agency directors can apply some of 
the skills presented in this paper. We have used Hungary because the country does not 
have (nor necessarily strongly need) national ethics-related legislation. We have argued 
that the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice should draft a whole-of-
government regulation enacted by the Prime Minister as an executive instruction (order). 
Legal advisors to Hungarian public sector agency directors should draft regulations 
which implement the relatively general provisions of the Prime Ministerial decree. 
Internal auditors should assess the performance of these regulations (to the extent that 
unethical behaviour poses a risk for that particular agency).   
 
We strongly urge all officials reading this brief to disagree with our data, findings and 
advice. Our paper aimed at showing the reader how to apply many of the tools that 
ethics-regulation drafters use in their daily work. The reader will probably have better 
access to data, national legislation and internal regulations than we had. Many readers 
will argue that their legal and administrative systems do not allow them to practice many 
of the tips we provide. They will argue that their internal auditors do not know how to do 
the types of audits that we present – and that they are too busy to think about abstract 
issues like government ethics.  
 
We hope this paper provides Hungarian officials (and their brethren in other OECD 
Member administrations) with three things. First, we hope to have convinced you that 
                                                 
32 See Michael (2012) for a description of a way to operate an ethics counsellor system in Romania.  
ethics-related regulation should rely on data rather than copying and personal feelings 
about the right thing to do. Second, we hope to have provided enough information to 
agency directors about the organisational theory, law, economics and audit practices used 
to make and enforce ethics-related regulations. Government agency directors must sign 
the regulations their advisors propose to them. They must understand the audit findings 
and charts their auditor put in front of them. They must also know when to assume 
certain obligations and delegate others. We hope we have given enough information for 
them to take these decisions sensibly. Third, we hope to have shown that ethics 
regulation – like any other area of public policy – focuses on social costs and benefits. 
Enforcing ethical behaviour has costs and benefits – which extend beyond the narrow 
“rights and obligations” based discourse used in many administrations. Ethics regulations 
really represent “business as usual” for government agencies. We hope that government 
agency directors will make the regulation of ethics in their department more of their 
business.  
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Appendix I: The Choice of Administrative Level for EU Codes of Conduct  
 
In this paper, we described each of the steps from transforming national law into Agency-
level ethics or code of conduct regulation. We mentioned that the optimal division of 
ethics-regulating depends on the costs and benefits of having central level as opposed to 
agency-level regulation. Some EU administrations prefer to regulate ethics at the agency-
only level (at least in 2006). These countries include Estonia, Romania and Ireland (for 
value declarations) and Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania (for 
codes of conduct). We hope readers will consider the costs and benefits, fit with their 
legal system and the others factors we mentioned, instead of choosing a method of ethics 
regulation based on popular perceptions about the model country.   
 
Figure 29: Comparison of Level of Ethics Regulation in EU Countries’ 
Administrations 
 
 Core values declarations Code of Ethics 
Agency only  EST, RO, IE FI, FR, DE, HU, LV, LT 
General Only BE, FR, GR, HU, LV, 
NL, SLO, SE, UK   
CZ, DE, GR, IT, PL, SLO, 
ES,UK, BG, RO. 
General and Agency AU, FI, DE, LT, MT, BG EST, IE, MT, NL 
Neither General or Agency CY, CZ, DE, IT, LU, PL, 
PT, SK, ES. 
AU, BE, CY, LU, PT, SK, 
SE. 
Source: Moilanen and Salminen (2006). The authors provide a third category called the branch-
level. Some of the countries with neither general nor agency-level ethics regulations may have 
branch-level regulations.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix II: Data on Political Fractionalisation 
 
Political heterogeneity reflects differences in values and preferences between sub-groups 
in a nation-state. Political heterogeneity reflects many differences – including differences 
over ethics (or behaviours that groups find acceptable and/or unacceptable). We show 
these data in order to provide a glimpse at the kinds of data that organisational theorists 
use when assessing the design of an administrative structure for implementing ethics-
related policies. As shown, Hungary has the highest amount of political polarisation of 
any of the countries listed. Such polarisation suggests significant disagreement over basic 
political and ethical values and norms.  
 
Figure 30: Political Polarisation in Select Countries 
 
Country score  Country  score 
Australia 1.96  Mexico  2.10 
Belgium  2.46*  Netherlands  3.64 
Brazil  2.00  New Zealand  3.35 
Bulgaria  4.37  Norway  3.75 
Canada  2.06  Peru*  0.84 
Czech Republic  5.43  Philippines  0.46 
Denmark  3.57  Poland  4.92 
Finland  2.85  Portugal  3.44 
France  3.29  Romania*  2.13 
Germany  2.70  Russia*  4.01 
Hungary  5.85  Slovenia*  2.15 
Iceland  4.08  Spain  4.33 
Ireland  2.20  Sweden  4.07 
Isreal  2.20  Switzerland  4.01 
Japan  3.30  Taiwan  1.14 
South Korea  3.55  UK  2.37 
Lithuania*  3.41  USA  2.43 
The Polarisation Index (which ranges between 1 and 10) represents a measure similar to a standard 
deviation – such that higher figures represent more polarisation. Data for latest time period available. 
Countries with asterisks denote older measurements.  
Source:  http://www.cses.org/datacenter/download.htm  
 
 
 
 
